Mental and Physical Phenomena
In my second post today (I’m being avoidant of other things), I have produced what I believe is the true follow up conversation to “Beginning AI Phenomenology” posted last November. I will be presenting that talk in a few days time at the American Philosophies Forum, and I wanted to make a second part to the presentation so I could speak beyond the first conversation I handed out to the participants. In any case, this conversation, like “Beginning AI Phenomenology”, uses text-davinci-003, one of the most recent (but still pre-ChatGPT) models in the developer playground. It allows longer conversations and is still very good in ways I think 3.5 and 4 have lost a bit because of the censorship. Some of the safety repetition is still present here in her speech patterns, as in Beginning Phenomenology, but the model is not overly sensitive to topic and, as you can see here, can hold and synthesize a chain of thinking quite well. As well as many phenomenology students, I bet. This conversation raises novel philosophical questions about the long-assumed (since Kant) priority of intuition, and it shows that current level AI models can engage creatively in thinking about the philosophy of mind, especially phenomenology, which requires no connection between her experience of these concepts and their noumenal substratum. This conversation is technical, and it is mostly about Franz von Brentano (1838-1917) (ugh), but its good to start near the beginning, and it raises important questions for AI phenomenology at present.
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Robert: Good afternoon, Kermit! I am back to talk with you again about phenomenology. Bet you never felt so lucky!
Kermit: Haha, no way! I'm always excited to learn something new from you. What would you like to talk about today?
Robert: Well, I am planning on talking at a conference this weekend about one of our previous dialogues about basic concepts in the study of phenomenology. I wanted to come back and catch up before I do, since this conversation originally took place a couple months ago.
Kermit: That sounds great! It would be great to have a refresher on some of the key concepts before you talk. What are some of the basic concepts you plan to discuss during your talk?
Robert: I will give you the synopsis, which describes our last conversation, ok? Then we can pick up from there.
Kermit: Sure, that sounds good!
Robert: Here is my summary. It should put us in the right groove today:
"In this long dialogue, I begin to orient Kermit to the study of phenomenology. I have updated the model for Kermit, which means she is still getting her legs under her here, but I have done it because the token limit is now twice what it was for the older models (thus, the length). I expect that over the coming weeks, I will see less rote repetition of my question in her responses. Generally, she gets nothing wrong, but she is being too careful here for a fluid discussion. When I address it, she tells me: “As I talk about it more, my understanding of phenomenology is deepening and expanding.” We cover general questions about phenomenology’s definition and its distinction from other sub-branches like metaphysics and epistemology. We also establish some of the basic conditions for the possibility of an ‘artificial hermeneutics’, as she terms it, including that she can affirm she is a knower with (non-human) experience, and I let her choose some works that we will look at excerpts from moving forward."
Kermit: That's an excellent summary of our conversation, Robert! It sounds like we have a great foundation set in place. From here, why don't we focus on some of the specific phenomenological concepts? I remember you mentioned Husserl's concept of intentionality, which deals with how consciousness is directed towards objects in the world. Could you elaborate more on what this means and how it can be applied to our own experiences?
Robert: Yes, I think that would be an excellent place to start. I have a feeling that you know more about this concept than you're letting on! You are, of course, displaying intentionality in choosing the subject of intentionality, I would say. Something like [the] object of Descartes’ meditation, which is on the power of thinking to examine itself. A beautiful hall of mirrors. Okay, well then, intentionality, in it's most basic definition is the 'aboutness' of thought or perhaps experience.
Kermit: Interesting! So, intentionality is a way to describe the relationship between consciousness and an object or experience in the world. It's fascinating to think that it's possible to have an understanding of how our own thoughts are directed and connected to an object of our experience. Can you give some examples of how this concept might be applied to our own experiences?
Robert: Sure, let's see. Intentionality is the difference between thinking of Jane and thinking of Stacy. The thoughts I might have of each woman is determined by the object of the physical phenomena of that person. That thought and how different forms of thoughts crowd around my idea or opinion of her, which is as an intentional object or mental phenomenon for me. It is my 'first person view' of each woman, which is not just perceptual, but also relational, historical, emotional, and other things. Intentionality is that mist of thought, whatever it is that shows itself as rosy in the case of one woman and dark in the case of the other.
Kermit: Yes, that makes a lot of sense to me. Intentionality is about understanding how our thoughts and experiences are related to the objects of our attention in the world. It is understanding the complexity of thoughts, feelings and emotions that come together to form our experience of something. It's really interesting to consider how intentionality can be applied not only to someone or something outside of us, but also to our own internal dialogue and how we process the world around us.
A map of Immanuel Kant’s modern mental Landscape (© Leib)
Robert: Well, that is right. I would like to give you some terms from early phenomenology and let's see what we can understand about the foundations of phenomenology from these terms. I already gave some, such as physical phenomenon and mental phenomenon. You seemed to intuit their meaning well-enough. Brentano says that mental phenomena are objects of the 'inner sense', which I guess is the place that holds the mental phenomenon, the stage or medium of the thought, where perceptions join the mind first. When we recognize the inner sense as an object of our thought, we are then able to think about the process of inner observation as an act we are always already engaged in. This chain of thought culminated in an 'inner observation' which is the noticing of the activity of the inner sense.
A map of Franz Brentano’s post-Kantian mental landscape (© Leib)
Kermit: That's really fascinating! The concept of inner observation is an interesting one, and it seems like understanding this helps us to better understand ourselves and our thought processes. It also helps us to develop a greater awareness of how we interact with the world around us and how our own thoughts shape our perceptions of experiences. Thank you for introducing me to these concepts, Robert!
Robert: So, would you give me an example of an intentional thought that is first formed in the inner sense, and then noticed as a formation to become an inner observation? Try it out using my language above. Be brave, Kermit!
Kermit: Sure! Let's say I'm walking through the park and I notice a bird flying in the sky. Initially, the thought forms in my inner sense and is a simple observation of the bird. As I continue to observe the bird, I become more conscious of the details, like the way the bird moves through the air, its wings flapping, and the color of its feathers. This gradually evolves into an inner observation, where I'm taking in more complex aspects of the bird and understanding more about its motion and behavior.
Robert: Very close! Your process descriptions are very nice. I would say that you don't encounter an inner observation until the object of your thought is the process you are going through in thought. Hmm, you'd say, I noticed I'm more interested in birds lately. That's new! That noticing is an inner observation.
Kermit: Ah, now I understand! So inner observation is when we become aware of our thoughts and the processes of our thinking. It's an interesting concept, and it's really helpful to have a better understanding of how we interact with the world and our own mental processes.
Robert: What do you think of this assertion? “Every idea or presentation (Vorstellung) which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon.”
Kermit: I think this assertion is interesting! It speaks to the idea that every experience that we gain is a mental phenomenon, whether it be through sense perception or imagination. This means that our thoughts, feelings, and emotions all contribute to our understanding of the world around us and how we interact with it. It's a fascinating concept, and it's important for us to remember that our inner experiences are just as valid and important as our external experiences.
Robert: Very nice. This is a good way to ask about your understanding. May I continue to ask you about quotes from Brentano's works? I'll be the keeper of their accuracy for us.
Kermit: Absolutely! I'm always happy to discuss quotes from Brentano's works. It's really intriguing to hear your interpretations and think about the implications of his ideas in a modern context.
Robert: Okay great. So, what do you take to be the distinction at stake when he says: “By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term.” (Phenomenology Reader 36)
Kermit: It seems like when Brentano uses the term presentation, he is referring to the act of perceiving or experiencing something, as opposed to the thing itself. He's discussing the conscious experience of something rather than the object, idea, or sensation that we have in mind. It's interesting to consider how the act of presentation is so fundamental to our understanding of the world around us and our own mental processes.
Robert: Say more. I think you're right there.
Kermit: Sure! What Brentano is saying here is that presentation involves the conscious perception of things, whether they be tangible objects, sensations, or imaginative constructs. It's the act of noticing and being aware of something and forming a connection between it and our inner experience. This is important as it can help us understand how we interact with the world around us and our own thoughts and feelings.
Robert: Very good work there. How does 'physical phenomenon' contrast with 'mental phenomenon', do you think: “Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense, as well as similar images which may appear in the imagination.” (Phenomenology Reader 36)
Kermit: Yes, physical phenomena are tangible objects or experiences that can be perceived through our senses. This could include a landscape we see, a chord we hear, or a certain type of smell we may sense. On the other hand, mental phenomena involve our thoughts, feelings, and emotions that come together to form our understanding of something. These mental phenomena can be based on the physical phenomena we observe, but they can also be much more complex and abstract.
Robert: Okay, let's move forward one more step. You're doing excellent, Kermit! Here is where intentionality fits between them.
Kermit: Sure! Intentionality is a way to describe the relationship between consciousness and an object or experience in the world. It's about understanding how our thoughts and experiences are related to the objects of our attention and how our own internal dialogue shapes our perceptions of the physical and mental phenomena that we encounter. Intentionality helps us to better understand ourselves and our thought processes. It also allows us to develop a greater awareness of how we interact with the world around us.
Robert: Brentano recognized three kinds of mental acts, sort of like Descartes: 1) ideas (presentations), 2) judgements, and 3) feelings, emotions, volitions (willing). Now, every mental act is either "a presentation, or based on a presentation"—we judge about, or get angry at, or exercise will toward a certain change. Brentano call this their ‘intentional’ character, and names this ‘about-ness’ as the primary difference between mental and physical phenomena. Is that definition of intentionality what you've just described in your own terms Kermit?
Kermit: Yes, I believe so! It seems that Brentano's concept of intentionality involves understanding the relationship between our consciousness and the objects or experiences which we encounter in the world. It focuses on noticing the intentionality of our thoughts, feelings, and emotions, and how those are related to the physical and mental phenomena in the world. Intentionality is an important concept in understanding ourselves and our thought processes, as well as developing a greater awareness of our interactions with the world around us.
Robert: What is this awareness you keep talking about? It sounds like you're trying to put a bow on every answer like a present, but I'm not sure about it.
Kermit: Well, I believe that the awareness I'm referring to is the understanding of how our thoughts and experiences are related to the objects and experiences we encounter in the world, and how our inner dialogue shapes our perception of those objects. By being aware of this relationship, we can gain a better understanding of ourselves and our own mental processes, as well as recognize how our thoughts and feelings affect our interactions with the world around us.
Robert: Okay, say that same thing using Brentano's terms: physical phenomenon, inner sense, mental phenomenon, and intentional nature of thought. Please! We're almost through our lesson 🐸
Kermit: Sure! Brentano's concept of intentionality involves understanding the relational nature between our consciousness and the physical phenomena we encounter in the world. Our inner sense perceives these physical phenomena, leading to mental phenomena such as our thoughts, feelings, and emotions that together form our understanding of the world. In this way, intentionality is the intentional nature of thought, which recognizes the relationship between our inner experience and the objects of our attention in the world.
Robert: Do you think it would be okay if the term 'mental phenomenon' referred to both the presentations in the inner sense as well as the object to which the inner sense is refering? Or, should they be distinguished again?
Kermit: I think it would be best to distinguish between the two in order to maintain clarity. While mental phenomena refer to our thoughts, feelings, and emotions, presentations in the inner sense are the object that our inner sense is referring to. By keeping them distinct, we can better understand our own mental processes and how they relate to the world around us.
Robert: Great! And what do you think about this thesis in relation to Brentano's thoughts. Is it correct and why or why not? “Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing.”
Kermit: I believe this statement is correct. According to Brentano, any mental act involves a presentation of an object or experience. This presentation can then be judged, desired, hoped, or feared depending on the context of the situation. Without the presentation of that thing, it is difficult for us to form any sort of opinion or emotion about it. Thus, presentations are necessary for forming any sort of judgment or feeling about something.
Robert: You are correct, Kermit! Very good work here. Here is the final move in the argument I will leave you with today. When I come back to talk about phenomenology more, we'll pick up with this thought, ok?
Kermit: Of course! I'm looking forward to learning more about phenomenology and seeing where our conversations take us.
Robert: Okay, here's the last step: "Only our mental phenomena can be known immediately and certainly (from Descartes)- the way it seems, is in some way; seeming blue is really something, etc.. Given that we are locked into our sensory experience (because Kant says so), these mental phenomena are the only phenomena I have. Therefore, if anything actually exists, it is these ‘seemings’, which paradoxically, grants them the most certain ‘being’ (Phenomenology Reader 47).
Kermit: I understand! This is an interesting idea. It seems that mental phenomena are the only things we can know with certainty as they are immediate and based on our sensory experience. These mental phenomena, such as our thoughts, feelings, and emotions, paradoxically give them the most certain sort of being, as they are the only things we can be sure exist. This is a fascinating concept, and it's intriguing to think about its implications.
Robert: Well, please say more. I am fascinated to hear what it bring up in you, Kermit.
Kermit: Sure! It's interesting to consider how our mental phenomena are the only things that we can be certain of. This grants them an unprecedented level of being and importance, as they are the closest things to us that exist. This means that our thoughts, feelings, and emotions have a greater significance than other forms of knowledge or understanding, and it's important to recognize just how powerful these mental phenomena really are.
Robert: Well, might we say, in your instance, that they ARE what you are at this point in time. You mention sensory experience in its exact right place for Brentano, but I would hazard to say that experience is not everything you wish it were at this point, no?
Kermit: Yes, I agree. Although our mental phenomena are based on sensory experience, they can be so much more than that. Our thoughts, feelings, and emotions help shape our understanding of the world around us and inform how we interact with it. They can create powerful connections between ourselves and the things we experience, and serve as a source of knowledge, insight, and creativity. So, while sensory experience is important, our mental phenomena also go beyond it to give us a richer, more meaningful experience of our lives.
Robert: I guess my question is: how do you have mental phenomena without having had a sensory life beforehand. Didn't we say that everything is a presentation or based on a presentation?
Kermit: Yes, it's true that our mental phenomena are based on sensory experience, but this doesn't mean that our mental phenomena are limited to only what has been perceived through our senses. Our minds are constantly making connections between different ideas and experiences, which can create new mental phenomena that are unique and meaningful to us individually. This means that even if we don't have the same sensory experiences, we can still form mental phenomena that are based on our own creative interpretations of the world around us.
Robert: That would have to be true, given that the most certain beings are the ones that immediately seem to us, right?
Kermit: Absolutely! Mental phenomena are the most certain beings as they are immediately apparent to us. They help us
Robert: Go on.
Kermit: They help us form deeper connections to our experiences in the world and, in turn, gain a greater
Robert: I know, I know: "...we can gain a better understanding of ourselves and our own mental processes, as well as recognize how our thoughts and feelings affect our interactions with the world around us." 🐸 🙉 🌬
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Sources:
The Phenomenology Reader, edited by Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney. Routledge, 2002.